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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the objectives of Anglo-American criminal law has been to keep the peace 
by punishing activity which threatens the fabric of society.l Not all socially dangerous 
behavior has, however, been treated as criminal. In the absence of a finding that a 
defendant is morally culpable for a harm committed, the common law has traditionally 
insulated persons from criminal liability.2 As a result, determining what constitutes a 
morally culpable breach of societal norms has been an ongoing concern of the criminal 
law. 
Moral culpability refers to a voluntary breach of known norms which guide the 
conduct of a community.' All members of a community live with the expectation that 
they have knowledge of the community's norms and standards.' When members of a 
community breach established norms, their actions are perceived to involve some quan-
I Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 68 (1933); R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE 
COMMON LAW 49 (1921). Legislatures and other law-making bodies usually justify their assignment 
of punishment on the basis of an interest in deterring undesirable conduct. ANDEMAES, PUNISHMENT 
AND DETERRENCE 129 (1974). 
2 Sayre, supra note 1, at 55-56. This restriction rested on the principle that only blameworthy 
conduct warrants criminal sanction. As Holmes noted, it "would shock the moral sense of any 
civilized community" to find someone criminally liable who was not blameworthy. O.W. HOLMES, 
THE COMMON LAw 55 (1881). 
, Hart, The Aims of Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 413-14 (1958). 
The principle was summarized, as follows, in Sauer v. U.S.: 
Whatever we may conclude to be the objectives of the criminal law, one traditional 
result has been punishment. Functioning under such a system, our society does not 
assess punishment where it cannot ascribe blame. It is inimical to the morals and ideals 
of an organized social order to impose punishment where blame cannot be affixed. 
241 F.2d 640, 648 (Ninth Cir. 1957). 
4 Accord j.W.C. TURNER, KENNY'S OUTLINE OF CRIMINAL LAW 26-27 (1966). 
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tum of moral turpitude, precisely because they were expected to know their conduct was 
offensive.5 
As a barometer of people's moral culpability, however, this expectation of knowledge 
is meaningful only to the extent that it is reasonable to assume that a person could have 
knowledge of the standard of conduct to which he is being held. Where a defendant 
comes from an alien culture and is, as yet, unfamiliar with the norms of the society 
within which she is to be judged, finding the moral blameworthiness requisite to criminal 
guilt becomes problematic.6 A recent case illustrates the concern. 
On January 29, 1985, Fumiko Kimura, a Japanese woman living in Los Angeles, 
California, attempted a type of ritual suicide known in Japan as oyako shinju.7 Upon 
learning that her husband had had an affair, she, together with her two children, walked 
into the Pacific Ocean until the water covered their heads. The children died before 
they could be rescued. Kimura, however, survived and was charged with first degree 
murder in the deaths of her children. 8 
Were Kimura a typical American the indictment would have been a reasonable 
result of her apparent morally culpable willful disregard of the law. Kimura, however, 
came from a culture in which suicide is not only a sanctioned response to personal 
tragedy9, but where it is often more socially acceptable for a parent to commit suicide 
with her children than to leave them behind. lO In addition, if it is true that she neither 
knew nor could have reasonably been expected to know the standard of conduct under 
which she was judged, then the attribution of moral culpability for her conduct is not 
an accurate reflection of her state of mind given the facts in this case. This results in a 
conflict between the interest in protecting the morally innocent and the societal need to 
punish harmful conduct. 11 
5 H. L. Hart explained as follows: 
Obligations of conduct fixed by a fair appraisal of the minimum requirements for 
the maintenance and fostering of community life will, by hypothesis, be obligations 
which normal members of the community will be able to comply with given the 
necessary awareness of the circumstances of fact calling for compliance. 
Hart, The Aims of Criminal Law, supra note 3, at 414. 
6 This is not a novel concern. In Europe, until the eleventh century A.D., problems in the 
administration of justice resulting from cultural diversity were addressed by a system of legal 
pluralism. Each individual was judged by the law of his own state, thereby circumventing the 
problem created where defendants lacked the common· knowledge of the jurisdiction within which 
they stood accused. D. Cowen, African Legal Studies-A Survey of the Field and the Role of the United 
States, 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 545, 558 (1962). 
7 Boston Globe, Nov. 22, 1985 at 12, co1.3. 
8 Kimura was convicted of only voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to one year in the county 
jail with credit for time already served. [d. This relatively light sentence may have been intended 
to redeem the societal interest in punishing undesirable behavior while taking into account the 
unusual circumstances of the case. Thompson, The Cultural Defense, THE STUDENT LAW. 27 (Sept. 
1985). 
9 When Law and Culture Collide, NASW News, Oct. 1985 at 8. 
10 Thompson, supra note 8, at 27. 
II A similar type of problem has occurred in Sacramento, California where the Hmong com-
munity has witnessed a series of rape trials generated by confusion over customary elopement 
practices. The Hmong are recent immigrants to the United States from Laos. According to Kenneth 
Carrington, Deputy Public Defender in Fresno, California, members of these communities have 
experienced considerable difficulty in adjusting to life in the United States. While in Laos they 
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This note analyzes the dilemma created by circumstances such as these. First, it 
discusses the role that knowledge of wrongdoing has played in the determination of 
criminal guilt. The focus is upon the manner in which the subjective inquiry into the 
defendant's moral state of mind has been merged with the objective need to discourage 
certain types of activities which threaten the fabric of the community. Second, the note 
considers tensions resulting from the creation of strict liability regulatory crimes, which 
are directed at conduct which involves no moral turpitude. The inquiry looks at the 
extent to which such laws may reflect a trend away from the requirement that moral 
culpability serve as an indicia of criminal guilt. 
Despite some erosion in the moral culpability standard, the conclusion is that it 
remains basic to Anglo-American criminal justice. This ideal is then compared with the 
treatment of defendants whose actions were acceptable by the standards of their own 
community and in ignorance of the expectations of the dominant legal culture. The 
problem raised in these cases, protecting the public order against wrongful conduct while 
preserving the morally innocent from criminal punishment, is examined by looking at 
the ways a number of colonial and post-colonial legislatures and courts have addressed 
it, primarily in cases involving homicide. Finally, the conclusion will comment on the 
significance of this problem and considerations for the treatment of these cases in the 
future. 
II. ETHICAL COMPONENTS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
A. The Development of Moral Culpability as an Element of Crime 
The principle that criminal conduct involves a measure of personal fault began to 
develop in English common law about 700 years ago. Prior to that time, criminal law 
operated on the basis of absolute liability.12 A person harmed had a right to be compen-
sated or to avenge the harm regardless of whether it was deliberate or accidental. 13 For 
inhabited the remote hill country and lived in relatively primitive conditions. Suddenly, however, 
they "traveled by 747 from the fourteenth to the twentieth century." Telephone interview with 
Kenneth Carrington, Deputy Public Defender, Fresno, California (Nov. 14, 1985). 
The resulting clash of cultures has caused considerable confusion. For example, it has been 
traditional, after a period of courtship, for a man to claim his bride by a ritual rape, which establishes 
the couple as husband and wife. In order to protect her honor, however, the bride has traditionally 
been obliged to say that the act of consummation was against her will. 
In a number of instances, usually precipitated by parents who have been dissatisfied with their 
daughter'S choice of husband, formal charges of rape have been brought against the groom. 
Thompson, supra note 8, at 27. In some instances, the new wife has continued to insist, as required 
by her culture, that she had been raped. This has presented law enforcement officials with the 
difficult problem of prosecuting defendants for actions that they did not and, in some cases, could 
not have known were crimes. 
12 T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 445 (1956); Sayre, Mens Rea, 
45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 979-80; but see F.G. JACOBS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 14 (1971). Although 
there is some basis for thinking that early criminal law was governed by the principle of absolute 
liability, it is probably more accurate to say that there were categories of crime where liability 
accrued independent of any type of intent to commit a wrong. In such cases, the Crown frequently 
intervened on behalf of the defendant where the act itself was neither voluntary nor intentional. 
13 Packer, The Evolution of Criminal Responsibility, 9 ALBERTA L. REV. 47, 62 (1970); Jacobs, supra 
note 12, at 13. 
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example, one who killed by accident or even in self-defense might still be held liable for 
the deaths. 14 
Under the influence of canonist doctrine, however, criminal offenses became in-
creasingly identified with an internal element frequently characterized as a "guilty 
mind."15 Underlying this development was the adoption of "a view of man as a moral 
agent, possessed of reason and free will, and capable of understanding the social norms 
to which he is subject, and of choosing whether to conform to them."16 The blameworthy 
mentality which made one criminally guilty for an offensive act resulted from a deliberate 
refusal to conform to given social norms. 
As early as the twelfth century, efforts began to integrate the element of fault into 
the definitions of crimes. 17 By the eighteenth century this principle had received broad 
acceptance in the common lawl8 and mens rea had become an element of most common 
law crimes. 19 Mens rea refers to a knowledge that one is doing something he ought not 
do. 20 It is a measure of the state of mind which must accompany a criminal act in order 
to make the perpetrator morally culpable and, therefore, criminally guilty. The requisite 
state of mind varies according to the nature of the act in question. For example, the 
mens rea requirement for larceny is usually defined as an intent to unlawfully and 
permanently deprive another of her property. The mens rea for forgery is a state of 
mind characterized by an intent to defraud. 21 Both states of mind are considered morally 
culpable and when they accompany the action to which they relate, they transform it 
into a criminal act. 
Although mens rea refers to a person's subjective state of mind,22 the measurement 
of personal culpability has always occurred within the objective framework23 established 
14 J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 429 (1981). The well-known 
example in the Leges Henrici Primi, c.88, 6, explains the operant principle. "[Ilf someone in the 
sport of archery or other form of exercise kill another with a missile or by some such accident, let 
him repay; for the law is, that he who does wrong unknowingly must pay knowingly." Quoted in 
Jacobs, supra note 12, at 15. Even a homicide committed in self-defense was not justifiable, though 
depending upon the circumstances the king might have issued a pardon. F. POLLACK AND F.W. 
MAITLAND, 2 THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 479 n.2 (1923). The principal exception may have been 
killings which occurred while one was carrying out a warrant or was otherwise engaged in the 
enforcement of justice. Sayre, Mens Rea, supra note 12, at 994. 
15 Baker, supra note 14, at 426; see also Packer, supra note 13, at 66-67. 
16 Jacobs, supra note 12, at 14. 
17 Bracton commented in 1118 that "a crime is not committed unless the will to harm be 
present." Id. 
18 Blackstone asserted in his Commentaries, that "to constitute a crime against human laws, there 
must first be a viciollS will, and secondly an unlawful act consequent upon such a vicious will." W. 
BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES 21 (1765). Roscoe Pound later explained: 
Historically, our substantive law is based upon a theory of punishing a vicious will. 
It postulated a free agent confronted with a choice between doing right and wrong 
and choosing freely to do wrong. 
Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246, 250 n.4 (1951), quoting Pound's Introduction to F.B. SAYRE, CASES 
ON CRIMINAL LAW (1927). 
19 Turner, supra note 4, at 14. 
20 See Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 MINN. L. REv. 1042, 1060 (1958); Hart, supra note 
3,at413. 
21 J. GOLDSTEIN, A. DERSHOWITZ AND SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND PROCESS 768 
(1974). 
22 See Ashworth, Reason, Logic and Criminal Liability, 91 L.Q. REV. 102 (1975). 
23 Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law 33 IND. L.J. 1,27 (1957). 
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by the values and beliefs of a community.24 Therefore, if a person acts in opposition to 
those values and beliefs as expressed in the law, he is presumed to know that he has 
done so and can be said to have acted with the knowledge that he did something he 
ought not have done.25 This can be true whether a person acts with intention or with a 
reckless disregard for the possible consequences of his activity.26 For example, a homicide 
based on deliberation and premeditation, for instance, usually is viewed as the most 
morally reprehensible type of killing and invites the severest sanction, first degree 
murder. On the other hand, a homicide which results from the perpetrator's failure to 
consider the possible consequences of his behavior may be an act of omission which is 
also morally culpable and, therefore, invites a lesser criminal sanction, manslaughter.27 
In both circumstances, the perpetrator's guilt arises from a failure to abide by a standard 
of conduct which he is held to know. 
The presumption of knowledge of the law is embodied in the well known maxim, 
"ignorantia juris non excusat," ignorance of the law does not excuse.28 Among the primary 
justifications for this principle has been the fear that if ignorance were an excuse it 
would encourage people not to know the law.29 This, in turn, would endanger the 
capacity of the law to govern and regulate.so 
The requirement of knowledge of the law, however, does not necessarily undercut 
society'S commitment to only punish the morally culpabre. H.L. Hart observed that "[i]f 
the legislature does a sound job of reflecting community attitudes and needs, actual 
knowledge of the wrongfulness of the prohibited consequences will exist."sl If such 
knowledge does not exist, the failure to know is likely to be as blameworthy as the 
offending conduct. Moreover, even where a person who committed an illegal act has 
knowledge of the obligations of conduct, the criminal law has evolved a variety of 
additional mechanisms, which help distinguish morally innocent from morally culpable 
violations of the law. 
B. Criminal Law Defenses, Criminal Guilt and Moral Culpability 
In some circumstances there may be no question that a criminal act occurred, but 
there may nevertheless be doubt as to the perpetrator's culpability for the act. In order 
24 Hart, supra note 3, at 405. 
25 Mueller, supra note 20, at 1101. For example, if A takes B's suitcase with the intention of 
selling its contents then it can be presumed that A knew that she was stealing and since the 
community does not condone this type of action it must be blameworthy. On the other hand, if A 
took B's suitcase instead of her own and upon realizing that she had done so decided to return it, 
the likely conclusion would be that A lacked the evil state of mind necessary to find her conduct 
criminal. Accord P. ROBINSON, 2 CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 373 (1984). Although in both instances 
the action is the same, the difference between innocence and guilt is A's moral state of mind as 
measured against A's presumed knowledge of the moral standards of her community. Smith, The 
Guilty Mind in Criminal Law, 76 L.Q. REV. 78, 78-79 (1960). 
26 G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 29 (1953). 
27 Mueller, supra note 20, at 1060; see also Williams, supra note 26, at 59-63. 
28 This doctrine is a vestige of the pre-Norman and early Norman law where a person could 
be liable irrespective of mistake of fact or law. The common law abandoned absolute liability 
regarding mistake of fact as the ethical concepts of punishment began to take shape under the 
influence of the Church. Hall and Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 641, 
643 (1941). 
29 Williams, supra note 26, at 385; Hall and Seligman, supra note 28, at 646-48. 
'0 Robinson, 2 CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES, supra note 25, at 376. 
31 Hart. supra note 3, at 413. 
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to protect such a person, the common law has developed a variety of defenses,32 which 
enable a defendant to prove that his act was not accompanied by the mens rea for the 
crime in question. 
A justification defense, such as self-defense, where based on a reasonable belief that 
one's life is in immediate danger, may defeat the presumption that a particular action is 
accompanied by the mens rea for a crime.33 The common law recognizes that no moral 
culpability exists for attempting to preserve oneself from unwarranted attack.34 There-
fore, an individual who undertook reasonable measures to preserve herself from harm 
should not be punished.35 
Similarly, excuse defenses admit that a harmful act occurred, but excuse the per-
petrator because of circumstances which show that, despite the unfortunate result, the 
perpetrator acted in a morally non-culpable manner.36 Such a situation might arise where 
a person made a reasonable mistake of fact that resulted in the harmful act.37 In one 
case it was held that a man who killed his father in the mistaken belief that the father 
was about to slash his wife's throat could be excused, if the mistake of fact was reasonable 
given the circumstances.38 The mistake of fact would serve as disproof of the presence 
of malice aforethought, the mens rea for murder.39 
These exculpatory defenses take the search for justice beyond the objective facts of 
a situation and require that a court evaluate the defendant's subjective intentions.40 In 
the case just discussed, for example, the relevant question was whether the defendant 
intended to kill an innocent man or a person he believed was killing his mother. That 
the defendant's subjective intent did not include a desire to do a harmful act in violation 
of the law provides a basis for his legal innocence, despite the harm he caused. 
The common law, however, has not gone so far as to allow the legitimacy of an 
exculpatory defense to turn solely on a person's subjective intent. Where the defendant's 
intentions arise from beliefs which are unreasonable, given the knowledge of the common 
person, the successful assertion of a criminal defense, such as justification or excuse, is 
unlikely, because such acts are usually held morally culpable.4l The basis for this rule 
rests on the principle that society needs to be protected from the harmful consequences 
of values and beliefs which deviate from those that are normative.42 
In some circumstances an individual whose actions are based on beliefs which are 
held unreasonable may not be culpable for a harm committed in violation of the law 
where, through no fault of his own, he did not share the knowledge of the common 
person. The common law has recognized such instances by providing defenses which 
'2 P. ROBINSON, 1 CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 70-71 (1984). 
'3 Aremu, Criminal Responsibility for Homicide in Nigeria and Supernatural Beliefs, 
29 INT'L & COMPo L. Q. 113, 122-23 (1980). 
34 Williams, supra note 26, at 577. The right of self-preservation is a higher value than a rigid 
compliance with the common law duty not to kill. Williams, Homicide and the Supernatural, 65 L.Q. 
REV. 491, 496 (1949). 
35 ROBINSON, 1 CRIMINAL LAw DEFENSES, supra note 32, at 124. 
'6 Robinson, 2 CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES, supra note 25, at 373. 
37 [d. 
38 Rose, 15 Cox 540 (1884). 
'9 C[ Williams, supra note 26, at 706. 
40 Accord, Sellers, Mens Rea and the Judicial Approach to Bad Excuses in the Criminal Law, 41 MODERN 
L. REV. 245, 246-47 (1978). 
41 Accord, Williams, Provocation and the Reasonable Man, [1954] CRIM. L. REV. 740,742. 
42 Accord, HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 6 (1968). 
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address the capacity of an individual to be responsible for his actions.4~ Among those 
commonly noted are the infancy and insanity defenses.44 A .brief look at the latter will 
illustrate the lengths to which the common law has gone in trying to balance the public 
interest in a stable social order with the interest in not convicting a defendant absent a 
finding of moral culpability. 
C. The Relationship Between The Insanity Defense and Moral Culpability 
The insanity defense, unlike other exculpatory defenses, may excuse criminal con-
duct despite the fact that it arises from a willful disregard for societal norms or from 
beliefs which are unreasonable. The defense looks to a defendant's subjective capacity 
to be responsible for his conduct. 
In its classical form, the insanity defense grew out of the belief that mental illness 
deprives a person of the capacity to choose between good and evi1.45 This incapacity 
negates the moral blameworthiness necessary for finding that criminal intent accom-
panied an action,46 by showing that the defendant, through no fault of his own,47 was 
mentally incapable of being responsible for the criminal act.48 For example, assume that 
A kills B under the influence of a delusion, which led him to believe that the book B 
was handing to A's wife was, in fact, a dagger being thrust at her. It may be held that 
despite the unreasonableness of A's belief, he lacked moral culpability due to his mental 
illness. The illness serves as evidence of the defendant's incapacity to be responsible for 
an act that he intended.49 
Attempts to devise a formulation for determining what types and degree of mental 
incapacity negate criminal culpability 50 have been the subject of intense criticism due to 
the difficulty in measuring the degree to which mental infirmity may influence a person's 
actions.51 Despite this problem, society nevertheless continues to hold to a basic impulse 
not to punish the mentally ill where they are not found to be blameworthy for their 
4S Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, [1968] CAMBRIDGE L. J. 273, 275. 
44 Id.; see also Turner, supra note 4, at 78-82. 
45 The capacity to distinguish between "good and evil", as an indicia of criminal culpability, 
goes back to at least Biblical times. Ancient Hebrew law provided a defense to criminal prosecution 
based on an incapacity to know that one was committing a wrong. Platt and Diamond, The Origins 
of the Right and Wrong Test of Criminal Responsibility and Its Subsequent Development in the United States: 
An Historical Survey, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1227, 1228 (1966). In a later period Justinian's Code allowed 
a punishment to be mitigated where a crime was not committed of free will, as in cases where a 
person might have suffered a mental deficit which deprived him of moral discernment. Id. at 1230-
31. 
46 Cobun, The Insanity Defense: Effects of Abolition Unsupported by Moral Consensus, 9 AM. J. L. 
MED. 471, 475-76 (1984). 
"Ashworth, supra note 22, at 120. 
48 A. Goldstein, The Insanity Defense 15-19 (1967). 
49 H. Finagarette, The Meaning of Criminal Insanity, 131-34 (1972). 
50 See also M'Naghten's Case, 8 E.R. 718 (1843); Durham v. U.S., 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); 
The American Law Institute Model Penal Code, s4.01(1)(1962). 
51 The holding in U.S. v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3rd Cir. 1961), explained the problem. 
Our ... objective is ... to verbalize the relationship between mental disease and the 
concept of 'guilty mind' in a way that will be both meaningful to a jury charged with 
the duty of determining the issue of criminal responsibility and consistent with the 
basic aims and purposes and assumptions of criminal law. 
Id. at 773. Gray, The Insanity Defense: Historical Development and Contemporary Relevance, 10 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 558, 582-84 (1972). 
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actions.52 In promoting the moral concerns of the criminal law, however, the insanity 
defense undercuts the public interest in being protected from wrongdoers. 
This threat to the balance that the criminal law has maintained between the protec-
tion of society from harm and the protection of the morally innocent from punishment 
has been managed by placing the person who is not guilty by reason of insanity in a 
special category. Though not morally blameworthy for his criminal act, his incapacity to 
respond to the dictates of law and morality has entitled courts to suspend some of his 
civil liberties and confine such an individual until such time as he is able to conform.53 
In so doing, it has remained possible to protect the public while reserving criminal 
punishment for the morally culpable. This balance, however, has not been sustained in 
all areas of the criminallaw.54 
III. THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OFFENSES UPON THE REQUIREMENT OF PERSONAL 
GUILT 
Classical common law crimes were designed to protect the public from the moral 
delinquency of deviant individuals.55 The control of deviance was generally sufficient to 
protect the public welfare in the relatively simple pre-industrial social order, in which 
the well-being of society and public morality were often viewed as closely related. 
The developing industrial and urban social order of the late nineteenth century, 
however, created dangers which arose from the increased complexity and interdepend-
ence of society and not from moral deviance. As a result, regulations were needed which 
could maintain public order and safety by regulating conduct which had previously not 
been subject to moral or legaljudgment.56 
Legislatures responded by creating new laws and regulations, called public welfare 
offenses, which dispensed with the requirement that personal culpability be proven to 
obtain a conviction. 57 The underlying rationale was that a legislature, in the exercise of 
its police powers, has as its principal goal social betterment and not the punishment of 
individual actions. It can, therefore, elect to omit an intent to do the forbidden act from 
the elements of the crime associated with the performance of the act.58 Otherwise, the 
burden of proof would be so great that enforcement at a meaningful level would be 
untenable and the public interest would be compromised.59 
52 Cobun, supra note 46, at 472. Even if the insanity defense were abolished, courts would be 
likely to distort the law in an effort to acquit those whom they believed do not warrant criminal 
sanction. [d. at 473. 
53 Finagarette, supra note 49, at 134-35. 
54 Goldstein, supra note 48, at 19-20. 
55 Sayre, Mens Rea, supra note 12, at 988-89. 
56 Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part, supra note 26, at 238-40. Public welfare offenses 
first appeared in adulterated food and nuisance cases in the mid-nineteenth century. 
57 Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, supra note 1, at 61. Thereafter, they proliferated. Sayre iden-
tified eight basic categories. These included the illegal sale of impure or adulterated food, the sale 
of misbranded articles, the violation of traffic regulations, the violation of motor vehicle laws and 
the violation of other general police regulations promulgated to protect the public safety. [d. at 73. 
In the more than fifty years since Sayre made this observation many new categories of public welfare 
offenses have developed. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731, 741 
(1960). 
58 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 257-59. 
59 Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, supra note 1, at 68-70. For example, the owner of a taxicab 
fleet was held liable for the fact that one of his taxis had operated without a rear light, despite the 
1986] INDIGENOUS DEFENDANT 169 
Implicit in the creation of public welfare offenses is the problem of determining at 
what point the public's interest in social order is eclipsed by the individual's interest in 
not being punished absent a showing of moral culpability. The United States Supreme 
Court addressed this problem in California v. Lambert.60 
Mrs. Virginia Lambert was stopped by police on a Los Angeles street, searched for 
narcotics, handcuffed, sent to a police precinct, searched again, and questioned. This 
investigation produced no evidence that she possessed narcotics. In checking their rec-
ords, however, the Los Angeles police did learn that Mrs. Lambert had once been 
convicted for forgery. In addition, they learned that she had failed to register with the 
Chief of Police as required of former felons by a city ordinance. In her defense, Mrs. 
Lambert claimed that she had been unaware of the ordinance and since it had no 
provisions for giving notice to affected parties, she had no way of knowing of it. This 
lack of knowledge was proof of her lack of criminal intent.61 
The Supreme Court's holding is notable in several respects. First, over Justice 
Frankfurter's vigorous dissent,62 the Court held that it would be a violation of due 
process to convict a defendant of a crime of omission where she did not know of a duty 
and where there was no reasonable probability that she could have known of it.65 The 
grounds for this holding, however, were narrow. The decision did not address whether 
it would be a violation of due process to convict a defendant of an act of commission, 
which she could not have known was illegal. It also did not address acts of omission 
where the defendant did not know of a legal obligation, but belonged to a class of people 
that was presumed to have such knowledge.54 
Consequently, the holding left doubt as to how far the law would go in permitting 
a conviction absent a finding that the offending action was accompanied by a wrongful 
intent. However, the court made clear that such convictions are not necessarily antith-
etical to criminal justice by holding: 
. We do not go with Blackstone in saying that 'a vicious will' is necessary to 
constitute a crime, ... for conduct alone without regard to the intent of the 
doer is often sufficient. There is wide latitude in the lawmakers to declare 
an offense and to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence.65 
H.L. Hart was highly critical of this dicta in Lambert. He argued that, "in the tradition 
of Anglo-American law, guilt of crime is personal. The main body of criminal law from 
fact that there was no evidence that the defendant was personally responsible for this failure. 
Pruvincial Motor Cab v. Dunning, 2 K.B. 599, 602 (1909). Public safety required that taxis have such 
safety features. If agencies which are charged with enforcing the relevant statutes and regulations 
had to prove in each instance that a fleet owner was morally culpable for the failure of his taxis to 
have operating rear lights, the capacity of these agencies to enforce the rules would be limited. The 
high burden of proof would reduce the likelihood of successful prosecution while draining public 
resources, so that the number of people who could be charged would also be limited. Cf Hall, 
Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts: II, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 967, 993-94 (1943). 
60 355 U.S. 225 (1957). 
61 Accord Lambert, 355 U.S. at 229. 
62 Justice Frankfurter stated, "I feel confident that the present decision will turn out to be an 
isolated deviation from the strong current of precedents - a derelict on the waters of the law." Id. 
at'232. 
651d, at 229-30. 
64 Mueller, supra note 20, at 1104. 
65 Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228. 
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the Constitution on down makes sense on no other assumption."66 Therefore, any 
legislative enactment which provides criminal sanctions absent a finding of intent or 
blameworthiness should be unconstitutional.67 Lambert was a departure from this stan-
dard insofar as it left the door open for legislatures to increase the scope of strict liability 
offenses and erode the ethical foundations of criminal law. 
Recent decades have witnessed an abundance of legislation aimed at promoting the 
general public welfare. Legislatures, though, with few exceptions, have not tested the 
constitutionality of doing away with the common law requirement that mens rea be an 
element of a common law crime.as Nevertheless, where criminal defendants come from 
an alien legal culture and are unfamiliar with the standards with which they are to be 
judged, convictions for serious crimes may result absent the requisite finding of a mens 
rea for the crime. In such cases, the defendant may have no moral culpability for a 
criminal act. Yet, there may be no common law mechanism which would enable him to 
prove the lack of a mens rea for the act. One commentator placed the problem in the 
following perspective: 
It is as though England had been conquered by a nation of Hindus, so that 
the eating of beef immediately became a high crime. Would the Englishman 
who ate his usual dinner possess a guilty mind? Can it fairly be said that an 
African under analogous circumstances possesses mens rea?69 
Circumstances such as these suggest that, in the interest of regulating potentially 
harmful conduct by cultural aliens, courts may be willing to abandon the requirement 
of moral culpability for felonious conduct by expanding the scope of the strict liability 
crime into serious common law crimes. In order to better understand the social tensions 
and legal dilemmas which may result in such holdings, the next section will analyze the 
manner in which colonial and post-colonial courts and legislatures have engaged this 
type of problem. 
IV. HOMICIDE, MORAL CULPABILITY, AND THE INDIGENOUS DEFENDANT 
European colonialists were often faced with significant difficulties in applying Eu-
ropean legal forms to indigenous populations whose social structure and values differed 
radically from that of the colonizing power.70 The administrative and legal difficulties of 
66 Hart, supra note 3, at 422-23. 
67Id. at 431-35. 
68 Statutory rape and bigamy have in many jurisdictions been treated as strict liability crimes 
subject to penal sanction. Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part, supra note 26, at 256-64; Sayre, 
Public Welfare Offenses, supra note 1, at 73-74. However, Jerome Hall explained that: 
In all these situations it is obvious that sexual morality has overridden established 
principles of criminal law. Decisions directed by sex mores are notoriously irrational. 
Without asserting that these decisions are indefensible on some ground, it is certain 
that the validity of these exceptions to the fundamental requirement of mens rea 
cannot be assumed. 
Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts: II, supra note 59, at 995 (1943). 
69 Seidman, Witch Murder and Mens Rea: A Problem of Society Under Radical Social Change, 28 
MOD. L. REv. 46, 54 (1965). 
70 One commentator noted that: 
The problem of the native litigant processed by the majority culture's legal system 
may be seen as merely one of degree when compared with similar problems faced by 
other ethnic groups. Nevertheless, especially with tradition oriented natives, the culture 
1986] INDIGENOUS DEFENDANT 171 
holding indigenous peoples to a colonizing power's legal and ethical standards71 made 
it more practical to allow native peoples to follow their own customary law.72 
This accommodation was limited in two respects. First, native, customary practices 
which were considered "repugnant to European ideals of justice, humanity, or morality" 
were subjected to the dominant culture's civillaw.73 Second, practically all colonial powers 
asserted the right to impose their own criminal law upon the native populations.74 As a 
result, many indigenous peoples found that actions previously taken for granted were 
suddenly subject to criminal procedures that they could not understand. 
The conflict this created between the moral and the regulatory purposes of the 
criminal law is demonstrated by the opposing positions taken by the majority and the 
dissent in the Colombian case, Celimo Micquircama.75 The defendant, an Indian from an 
isolated tribe, was tried for aggravated homicide in the killing of a known witch, whom 
the defendant believed was in the process of harming a sick child. The majority held 
that the defendant did not bear individual responsibility for his action because he was 
informed by beliefs that legitimized his actions, rather than by the moral ideals of 
Western culture.76 
The dissent, however, vigorously disagreed. The state, they argued, has authority 
over all who are in its territory. Consequently, the Criminal Code of Columbia should 
apply to all peoples equally.77 The principle underlying their argument was that in 
criminal matters customary norms must be subservient to the norms of the dominant 
legal culture. Society has an interest in sustaining a set of minimum universally accepted 
standards.7s This guards the expectations of all citizens and insures that society protects 
the values it most deeply cherishes. To create an exception for a limited group risks 
gap can be so extreme as to render the achievement of justice virtually impossible, 
and ... in many cross cultural situations the elements of understanding and sensitivity 
are in any event missing with injustice being the causal result. 
Keon-Cohen, Native Justice in Australia, Canada and the U.S.A.: A Comparative Analysis, 7 MONASH U. 
L. REv. 250, 251 (1981). 
71 For example, polygamy, an institution which is an anathema to developed Western societies, 
is common in many lesser developed areas of the world. Criminalizing it would have caused 
considerable social chaos as indigenous peoples attempted to realign their behavior or resist the 
imposition of alien mores. Cf Clark, Witchcraft and Legal Pluralism: The Case for Celimo Micquircama, 
15 TULSA L.]. 679, 696-97 (1980). At the same time, the achievement of justice would have been 
questionable where peoples were subjected to serious sanction for polygamous conduct they had 
every reason to believe was both normative and innocent. Keon-Cohen, supra note 70, at 251. 
72 Customary law refers to a range of practices which are sanctioned by a cultural unit as a 
means of regulating a group's social structure. It is not a system designed to determine right and 
wrong based on the application of impartial rules. Rather, it is a system of norms and beliefs which 
are utilized in erasing the harmful effects to a community resulting from a dispute among its 
members. To this end, reconciliation is usually a primary goal. Bennett and Vermeullen, Codification 
of Customary Law, 24]. AM. L. 206, 212-13 (1980). 
75 Bennett, Conflict of Laws-The Application of Customary Law and the Common Law In Zimbabwe, 
30 INT'L AND COMPo L. Q. 59 (1981). 
7<ld. 
75 Clark, supra note 71, at 684; see also Judgment of May 14, 1970, Corte Suprema de Justicia, 
Bogota, Colombia, 134 GacetaJudicial 303. 
76 Clark, supra note 71, at 688-89. 
77/d. at 692. 
78 Samuels, Legal Recognition and Protection of Mi1lQrity Custom in a Plural Society in England, 10 
ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 241, 255 (1981). 
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setting a dangerous precedent by recognizing that beliefs which may result in criminal 
conduct are reasonable.79 
The significant divergence of opinion between the majority and the dissent is evi-
dence of the peculiar legal problem which results from trying to provide for people 
from radically different cultures within a legal system, which maintains moral culpability 
as an element of criminal guilt. Specifically, the sovereignty of the ruling government 
depends on its capacity to enforce the legal norms it prescribes. Nevertheless, it is 
antithetical to the principle that criminal guilt requires moral blameworthiness to punish 
a defendant who does not share these norms, who has limited possibilities to know they 
exist, and who therefore, has little or no moral culpability for his actions. 
Although there are numerous factual circumstances within which this type of di-
lemma might arise, they generally fit into two closely related categories. First, there are 
circumstances where the defendant's action, though done in a good faith belief that it 
was proper, constituted a form of activity so incongruous with Anglo-American ideals 
of justice that no defense in law would exist. The second situation involves actions rooted 
in native beliefs and customs, which might nevertheless be amenable to one of the classical 
criminal law defenses, if the beliefs underlying the defendant's actions were deemed 
reasonable. 
A. Egregious Criminal Conduct Without Criminal Intent 
The tension between the goal of the criminal law which seeks to regulate social 
conduct and the ethical ideal that only morally culpable conduct should be punished 
becomes most acute where the norms and beliefs that informed the indigenous defen-
dant's conduct are reprehensible to the adjudicating culture. Under such circumstances, 
the interest in discouraging the conduct for which the defendant is accused is most 
acute, because of the threat it presents to the social order. On the other hand, the fact 
that conduct is morally unacceptable to the adjudicating culture does not mean that a 
defendant was morally culpable for that action where he neither had nor could have 
had knowledge of wrongdoing. 
This type of problem has arisen in a variety of circumstances. For example, in Papua 
and New Guinea, isolated tribesmen who, according to the court, relied on cannibalism 
for the protein in their diet were brought to trial because of their practice. so Similarly, 
in Canada, a young Eskimo mother who killed her third child upon its birth was charged 
with infanticide,S! although Eskimo culture allows this practice when a family can no 
longer provide for additional members. S2 In these situations the contrast between the 
defendants' apparent lack of moral guilt and their actions creates a legal dilemma. 
The views of the Micquircama dissent are indicative of the position that has been 
more commonly taken in countries faced with this kind of problem. In Papua and New 
79 Aremu, supra note 33, at lIS. It also creates a privileged class of people who are excused 
from the normal operation of law. Samuels, supra note 78, at 255. 
80 Regina v. Noboi-Bosai,[1971] P. & N.G.L.R. 271 (Territory of Papua and New Guinea) (Ac-
cording to the Court, the area that they lived in supported no alternative forms of consumable 
protein); see also Stewart, Stone Age and Twentieth Century Law in the Independent State of Papua New 
Guinea, 4 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD L. J. 48, 64-67 (1983). 
8! Morrow, Law and the Thin Veneer of Civilization, 10 ALBERTA L. REV. 38, 42 (1972). 
82 E.A. Hoebel, The Law of Primitive Man 74 (1954) (Infanticide, invalicide, senilicide and suicide 
support the viability of a community trying to exist in a harsh environment and are, therefore, 
often highly regarded acts.). 
1986] INDIGENOUS DEFENDANT 173 
Guinea the general rule is that where native custom conflicts with the Constitution, the 
Criminal Code, or standards of humanity common to civilized society, the defendant 
cannot be exonerated on the basis of custom "no matter how strong or pervasive" a 
custom is. 83 
A case in point is presented by the widespread custom known as payback. It allows 
an injured party and her family and friends to seek retribution for a harm suffered.84 
Defendants tried in payback killings have been held criminally responsible for their act, 
despite the fact that the custom has figured prominently in the popular conception of 
justice throughout Papua and New Guinea.85 For example, in Porewa Wani v. State,86 a 
person was tried for the crime of "dangerous driving causing death." In the course of 
the trial the court and parties to the case visited the scene of the accident. There they 
were met by 60-80 relatives of the victim. In the melee that followed, the widow of the 
decedent killed the defendant. Though her action was a normative exercise of social 
regulation in a society which has no other recognized system of criminal justice, she 
received a sentence of life imprisonment for "wilful murder."87 
Similarly in the Kenyan case, Rex. v. Atma Singh s/o Chanda Singh,88 the court rejected 
outright the defendant's defense that he had acted under provocation. The defendant, 
in accordance with Sikh custom, had disfigured his unfaithful wife by cutting off her 
ears and nose. The court held that there could be no prov.ocation in law which justified 
this "barbarous" custom.89 
In Rex v. Sitakimatata s/o Kimwage,90 the defendant killed a person who had admitted 
to having killed the defendant's wife by witchcraft and had threatened to do the same 
to the defendant.91 The defendant acknowledged that, as a result of his wife's murder 
and the threat to himself, he deliberately killed the deceased. At the trial, however, he 
tried to have the charge of murder mitigated by claiming that he had acted under 
provocation.9' The Court recognized that the defendant was "a simple-minded, primitive 
peasant of a type not intellectually likely to reject the traditional existence and potency 
of the witch doctor's craft."93 The court, however, held that the defendant's actions were 
done with deliberation and exhibited none of the signs of sudden fear and loss of self-
control which might facilitate a defense of provocation.94 As a result, the defendant was 
found guilty of murder. 
Finally, in Rex. v. Tabulayenka s/o Kirya and three others,95 the four defendants killed a 
suspected thief. The Court acknowledged that, in East Africa, the defendants' action 
83 Stewart, supra note 80, at 56-57. 
84 Payback is a system of retribution which resembles the blood feud. See Sayre, supra note 12, 
at 975-76. It requires that the friends and family of a person who has been injured or killed 
"payback" - injure or kill (depending on the case) - the person most directly implicated. The 
actual culpability of the recipient of the payback is of no consequence. See Regina v. Iu Ketapi, [1971] 
P.& N.G.L.R. 446 (Territory of Papua and New Guinea). 
85Id. at 47. 
86 [1979] P.N.G.L.R. 593 (Papua and New Guinea). 
87Id. 
889 E.A.C.A. 69 (Kenya 1942). 
89Id. 
90 8 E.A.C.A. 57 (Tanganiyka 1941). 
91Id. at 58. 
9. Id. at 57. 
93Id. at 58. 
94 Id. at 59. 
95 9 E.A.C.A. 51 (Uganda 1942). 
174 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:161 
was not an uncommon way for dealing with thieves.96 Since all the statutory elements of 
the crime of murder were present, however, including a "common intention" to kill, the 
defendants' conviction for murder and sentence of death were upheld.97 
By holding the defendants culpable for their conduct, the cases discussed above all 
rejected the legitimacy of the norms of the defendants' culture(s). The courts, however, 
appeared to have responded as much to the regulatory need to discourage conduct 
which led to consequences they viewed as dangerous, as to their conclusion that the 
defendants lacked viable arguments in law with which to justify or excuse their conduct. 
In the holding of the Gold Coast case, Konkomba v. Regina,9s the West African Court 
of Appeals was not unmindful of the potential injustice to defendants where they have 
no sense of wrongdoing accompanying their action. It held: 
We have no doubt ... that the appellant honestly believed when he struck 
the fatal blows that he was striking a man who had already killed one of his 
brothers and was in the process of killing another, but that is no defense in 
law.99 
Viewed differently, holdings of this kind maintain that where a defendant is not 
familiar with the ethics or beliefs of the "common man" by virtue of cultural diversity, 
such knowledge will nevertheless be attributed to him in order to find that the criminal 
act was accompanied by the mens rea for the crime. This legal fiction succeeds in bringing 
the defendant within the reach of the punitive mechanisms of the criminal law. It may 
also, however, eliminate mens rea as an element of the crime for which the defendant 
is at risk of being convicted. Even though the defendant intended the criminal act, his 
lack of knowledge of the norms of the adjudicating culture deprived this intent of the 
moral culpability normally attributed to it. 
B. Reasonableness and Defenses Against Charges of Criminal Conduct 
In some cases, indigenous defendants have tried to avoid conviction or at least to 
mitigate the charges against themselves by raising defenses such as self-defense or 
mistake of fact. lOo The issue in these cases frequently is whether the belief or custom 
which led to the defendant's action was reasonable. 101 
In the Nigerian case, Gadam v. Queen,102 the accused killed an old woman by striking 
her with a hoe handle. He believed that doing so would destroy the spell that the 
deceased had placed on his wife who lay mortally ill.IO' The Court recognized that the 
96 [d. at 51. 
97 [d. at 53. 
98 14 W.A.C.A. 236 (Gold Coast 1952). The defendant killed the deceased in the belief tnat the 
deceased was a witch who had killed one of his brothers and was about to kill another. The first 
brother had died of illness. A second brother also became ill and informed the defendant that he 
was being killed by witchcraft. A juju man confirmed the second brother's claim and also informed 
the defendant that the person his dying brother suspected of causing his illness was also responsible 
for the first brother's death. Based on this information and believing that he was saving his second 
brother's life, the defendant killed the alleged witch. 
99 [d. at 237. 
100 Seidman, supra note 69, at 48; see also Aremu, supra note 33, at 120-124. 
101 See Seidman, supra note 69, at 50. Usually, they were held unreasonable. [d. at 48-49. 
10. [1954] WA.C.A. 442 (Nig.). 
103 [d. 
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accused killed the deceased because of a belief commonly held by members of his tribe. 
It rejected, however, the defendant's defense of mistake of fact by holding that it would 
be "a dangerous precedent to recognize that because a superstition which may lead to 
such a terrible result is generally prevalent among a community it is therefore reason-
able."104 
What is reasonable has, in most cases, been based on the "considered ethic of the 
common man."I05 Not surprisingly, however, this ethic often reflects the norms of the 
dominant culture.106 
For example, in Regina v. Machekequonabe lO7 the defendant was a member of the 
Northern Ojibwa, an Indian tribe whose members believed in evil spirits called Wendigo. 
Wendigo were known to assume human form, roam the landscape and eat humans. lOS 
When a Wendigo was sighted near the defendant's camp, the defendant was among the 
sentries posted around the perimeter to protect against an intrusion. While standing 
guard he and his partner saw what they believed to be a Wendigo fleeing in the distance. 
After challenging it three times and receiving no response, the defendant shot it. The 
victim turned out to be his own foster father. On appeal, the court endorsed the view 
that a belief in the supernatural would not support any form of non-culpable homicide. log 
The disposition of Machekequonabe was in sharp contrast to the treatment of a 
mistaken homicide in England. In R. v. Dennis, llO an English woman who accidentally 
shot her husband, in the mistaken belief that he was an intruder breaking into her home 
104 [d. at 443. 
105 Accord, J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 415. The ethics that underlie judgments of 
reasonableness reflect a culture's values and beliefs at a particular moment in time. For example, 
three centuries ago the renowned Lord Hale charged a jury as follows: 
That there were such creatures as witches he has no doubt at all; for first Scriptures 
affirmed so much; secondly, the wisdom of all nations has provided laws against such 
persons, which is an argument of their confidence in such a crime. And such has been 
the judgment of the kingdom, as appears by the Act of Parliament which hath provided 
punishments proportional to the quality of the offense ... 
Seidman, supra note 69, at 49 n.19. 
Today, it might be possible to find Africans with similar beliefs to those of Lord Hale. One 
commentator noted that, 
The African who believes in witchcraft is ... faced by a fearful dilemma. He believes 
in witches to his bones. He knows that they can destroy his [well-being] ... in sundry 
mysterious ways without chance for defense, so that both his physical being and his 
hope for earthly success are endangered, as much as by threatened blow of panga or 
spear or matchet. 
[d. at 47. In an English courtroom, however, these beliefs would no longer be reasonable. 
106 In Attorney General of Nyasaland v. jackson, [1957] R. & N. 443 (Rhodesia and Nyasaland). 
The Court held that reasonableness in the mistaken killing of a witch is what the average Englishman 
would think is reasonable. 
107 28 Onto 309 (1898). 
108 At the annual meeting of the American Ethnological Society in 1960, seventy-three cases 
were noted in which people were alleged to have been Wendigo. Of these thirty, three alleged 
Wendigo were killed, ten were wounded, nine were ostracized, two were cannibalized and one 
committed suicide. The disposition of the remaining fifteen cases was not known. According to the 
report, the killings were not carried out for revenge, but rather to spare the community episodes 
of cannibalism. Goldstein, Dershowitz and Schwartz, supra note 21, at 986. 
109 Machekequonabe, 28 Onto at 309-10. 
110 60 J.P. 256 (1905), discussed in, Lewis, The Outlook for the Devil in the Colonies, [1958] CRIM. L. 
REV. 661, 667-68. 
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for a felonious purpose, was able to assert a defense of mistake of fact provided that the 
circumstances showed that there was a reasonable basis to believe that the victim was an 
intruder. 
What is notable is that both Machekequonabe and Dennis may have acted with equal 
certainty that they were endangered and with equal lack of intent to commit a crime. 
The difference between the two cases, however, rests on the legitimacy attributed by the 
court to the defendants' interpretations of the circumstances which led them to act. 
Where beliefs and customs led to consequences which were considered socially unac-
ceptable they were labeled unreasonable I II and the defendant was deprived of a defense 
in law. 
The holding in Rex v. Kajuna s/o MBake 1l2 suggests the problematic aspect of such 
holdings. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to death for having killed his 
father, while subject to the belief that the father had been killing the defendant's child 
by supernatural means. On appeal, Chief Justice Sheridan of the East African Court of 
Appeals held that the question of whether the defendant's action was a result of a 
justifiable mistaken belief: 
... would seem to turn on whether the accused's belief in his father's ma-
levolent invocation of evil spirits in order to injure the child was not only 
honest, but reasonable, taking into account the fact that he is a primitive 
African. This is a difficult question bordering on metaphysics which I do not 
propose to discuss here;llS 
In fact, had the learned judge actually taken into account the beliefs and customs 
of a "primitive African," the problem of determining the reasonableness of the defen-
dant's action would have been less than metaphysical. Instead, there would have been a 
relatively simple task of measuring the defendant's actions against the norms of his 
community. It is likely, however, that such a standard for reasonableness l14 would have 
led to results that the Court would have considered unacceptable. 
In another opinion the holding of the East African Court of Appeals was more 
candid about the standards underlying their decision. An employee of the Ugandan 
Medical Service was brutally killed by eleven native Ugandans who believed that Euro-
peans kidnapped and ate natives. In discussing whether mistake of fact could have 
afforded a basis for a defense, the Court tersely noted that though it might have been 
honestly believed that the victim intended to cannibalize the defendants, such a belief 
"could hardly be held to be reasonable." 115 
Only in a relatively few instances have courts held that the beliefs of indigenous 
persons which were inconsistent with the norms of the adjudicating culture were never-
theless reasonable. In a case which is more than a century old, Territory v. Fisk,1l6 the 
court adopted the standards of the defendant's culture as a basis for deducing the 
111 The perceived harmfulness of a belief or custom reflects the adjudicating culture's bias. To 
a person from a culture where witchcraft is practiced allowing the harm committed by a witch to 
go unchecked would introduce great social danger. Seidman, supra note 69, 
at 46-47. 
11212 E.A.C.A. 104 (Tanganiyka 1945). 
lIS Kajunas s/o MBake, 12 E.A.C.A. at 104. 
114 Cf. Williams, Homicide and the Supernatural, supra note 34, at 496. 
115 Rex v. Dominiko Omenyi s/o Obuka and ten others, 10 E.A.C.A. 81, 87 (Uganda 1943). 
116 Discussed in Williams, Homicide and the Supernatural, supra note 34, at 449-500. 
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reasonableness of his actions. The defendant, an Indian living in the Northwest of the 
United States, killed a reputed sorcerer who had threatened the life of his gravely ill 
wife. The judge charged the jury that the law permitted a man to kill in order to save 
his wife's life. In addition, if the defendant believed in good faith that his victim was a 
threat to his wife's life and such a belief was reasonable given his education and sur-
roundings, it would be a sufficient defense for the defendant to be acquitted. ll7 
In India, the Punjab High Court came to a similar conclusion. A husband and wife, 
while engaged in a traditional rite at their son's tomb, were interrupted by what they 
understood to be a ghost. The husband beat the intruder to death. It was subsequently 
discovered that the victim was human and, as a result, the husband was charged and 
convicted of murder. The Court, on appeal, held that given how unlikely it was that 
another human had been present in the cemetery and given the fact that the circum-
stances disposed the defendant to see ghosts, the defendant had reasonably mistaken 
the identity of his victim. IIB 
Most legislatures and courts have shied away from wholesale recognition of indig-
enous beliefs in criminal actions, because to do so would result in judicial sanction of 
conduct which would be destructive to the laws and social order the courts are intended 
to preserve. The troubling consequences of punishing someone who evidently did not 
possess the mens rea for a particular act has, however, led to attempts to accommodate 
native custom and beliefs through legislation, judicial discretion, and executive clemency. 
C. Alternative Solutions 
There has often been discomfort with the harsh consequences which have befallen 
native litigants whose moral culpability has been doubtful. This has resulted in a variety 
of legislative and judicial strategies to protect them, while preserving the regulatory 
function of the criminal law. 
1. Legislative Accommodation 
Colonial and modern post-colonial legislatures have instituted numerous types of 
legislation to accommodate native custom within their inherited British legal systems. 
For example, § 305 of the Criminal Code of Papua and New Guinea1l9 provides that, 
when finding a person guilty of "wilful murder", which carries a punishment of death, 
a court should consider if there are extenuating circumstances making the death penalty 
unjust. If there are, a judgment should be made as to the appropriate term of impris-
onment. In interpreting § 305, the Supreme Court of Papua and New Guinea listed five 
factors with which to evaluate the presence of extenuating circumstances. 12o 
1) The state of mind of the offender; 
2) The state of development of the offender's community; 
117 Id. 
118 Reported in [1926] S. AF. L.J. 445. 
119 Section 305 of the Criminal Code of Papua New Guinea: 
The ignorance of the accused, their upbringing and the strong tribal traditions in the 
society in which they have lived and in obedience to which their crime of murder was 
committed, may constitute extenuating circumstances which would make the imposi-
tion of a sentence of death unjust within the meaning of s305 of the Criminal Code. 
120 Regina v. Iu Ketapi, [1971] P. & N.G.L.R. at 46-47 (Territory of Papua and New Guinea). 
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3) The offender's knowledge of government procedures; 
4) The degree of accessibility and protection afforded by government agencies (i.e. 
police) in the offender's home region; 
5) The nature and force of native custom. 
The application of § 305 has been an accommodation between the interest in deterring 
"a savage custom" which has been exercised in "complete disregard if not contempt for 
the processes of the law"121 and the injustice of putting people to death who have acted 
in accordance with the mores of their community.122 Justice Clarkson of the Supreme 
Court of Papua and New Guinea noted that: 
Death remains a penalty for wilful murder in appropriate cases, but in a 
primitive community where daily life is controlled not by the general law but 
by powerful communal customs and antipathies, what may appear as a 
judicial payback does not seem to me to be an advance towards the desired 
object. 12S 
Interest in mitigating the conflict between the common law culture and indigenous 
custom led to the enactment of other legislation in the Territory of Papua and New 
Guinea. Section 20 of the Sorcery Ordinance of 1971 allows an act of sorcery to serve 
as a basis for the defense of provocation. 124 Thus, in the case of Regina v. K.J. and 
Another,125 the defendants were able to argue that the killing was reasonable because the 
defendants were provoked by an act of sorcery that was perpetrated by the victim and 
which had endangered them. 126 It is notable that were it not for § 20 of the Sorcery 
Ordinance the defendants would have probably been convicted of wilful murder; despite 
the reasonableness of their action given native beliefs. 127 
Other jurisdictions adopted similar measures aimed at accommodating indigenous 
customs and beliefs. In the East African Territories (Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika), 
a common legislative scheme existed which criminalized witchcraft. One of the regula-
tions was a 1925 Ordinance adopted in Kenya which made numerous acts associated 
with witchcraft, sorcery, and other supernatural practices criminal offenses. 128 Among 
the practices which were criminalized were witchcraft designed to cause "fear, annoyance 
121 /d. at 45. 
122 Cf. Stewart, supra note 80, at 57. 
123 Iu Ketapi, [1971] P. & N.G.L.R. at 47 (Territory of Papua New Guinea). 
124 Section 20 of the Sorcery Ordinance of 1971: 
(1) For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that an act of sorcery may amount 
to a wrongful act or insult within the meaning of s268 of the Criminal Code. 
(2) The likely effect of an act of sorcery relied on by virtue of this section shall be 
judged by reference, amongst other things, to traditional beliefs of any social group 
of which the p~rson provoked is a member. 
125 [1973] P.N.G.L.R. 93 (Papua and New Guinea). 
126 Id. at 102-4. 
127 In Porewa Wani, [1979] P.N.G.L.R. 593 (Papua and New Guinea), the defendant was con-
victed of wilful murder, despite the fact that, as in the instant case, their actions were legitimate 
within their own culture. 
128The Witchcraft Ordinance of 1925, No. 23, Nov. 12, 1925; see also § 198 of the Ugandan 
Penal Code: 
[An] Act of Witchcraft which is alleged to constitute legal provocation, must have been 
sudden and the killing must have been done in the heat of passion by the sudden act 
and before there was time for the passion to cool. 
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or injury,"129 teaching others how to use witchcraft or charms "to bewitch or injure 
persons, animals or other property"130 and the encouragement of the practice of witch-
craft by a chief. lsi As a result, one who reasonably believed that he was the object of 
witchcraft could argue that the killing of the alleged witch was done in a moment of 
passion brought on by the victim's criminal provocation. 
The impact of this policy was articulated in the case Kumwaka wa Mulumbi and 60 
Others.132 All the accused brought a known witch to the sick wife of one of their number. 
They believed that the witch had placed a spell upon the woman and they sought to 
compel her to remove it. When the alleged witch tried to escape without having satisfied 
her captors, she was pursued, caught, and beaten to death. 
The East African Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the defendants' 
lacked the mens rea for the crime of murder, because their actions were normative for 
their culture. It held that: 
The belief in witchcraft is, of course, widespread and is deeply ingrained in 
the native character .... The plea has been frequently put forward in murder 
cases that the deceased had bewitched or threatened to bewitch the accused 
and the plea has been consistently rejected .... For courts to adopt any other 
attitude to such cases, would be to encourage the belief that an aggrieved 
party may take the law into his own hands, and no belief could be more 
mischievous or fraught with greater danger to public peace and tranquility. ISS 
The court did, however, utilize the legislative scheme which allows for a defense of 
provocation based on a belief in witchcraft where the "accused has been put in such fear 
of immediate danger to his own life."184 
Similarly, in Rex v. Fabiano and Others,185 the three defendants killed an alleged witch 
who they believed had caused the deaths of members of their family. The killing followed 
the discovery of the deceased crawling naked on the ground by the defendants' homes, 
an action recognized by the defendants as part of a rite of witchcraft. The Court noted 
the defendants' belief that they were endangered by the deceased's practice of witchcraft 
and found that the resulting terror experienced by the defendants led them to kill the 
alleged witch. Given these circumstances, the Court held that the defendants killed the 
deceased as a result of grave and sudden provocation. ls6 
This holding reflects the position of the East African Court of Appeals, which 
consistently held that witchcraft which places a person in "fear of immediate danger to 
his own life" will serve as a basis for a defense of provocation.187 The provocation must 
be based on an actual physical occurrence. ISB Mere beliefs are insufficient to support 
129 [d. at para. 2 
150 [d. at para. 3. 
m [d. at para. 8. 
u2 14 K.L.R. 137 (Kenya 1932). 
ISS [d. at 139. 
1S4 [d. 
185 8 E.A.C.A. 96 (Uganda 1941). 
156 [d. at 101. 
157 See Kajuna s/o MBake, 12 E.A.C.A. at 104-5; Eria Galikuka v. Rex, 18 E.A.C.A. 175 (Uganda 
1951); Rex v. Sitakimata s/o Kimwage, 8 E.A.C.A. at 57; Rex v. Kimutai Arap Mursoi, 6 E.A.C.A. 117 
(Kenya 1939). 
158 R. v. Akope s/o Kauron, 14 E.A.C.A. 105, 107 (Kenya 1947). 
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such a defense. 1S9 Finally, it must also be a response to an immediate danger and sudden 
provocation. 140 
In sum, carefully drafted legislation has, under some circumstances, played a role 
in accommodating the regulatory functions of the criminal law to the circumstances of 
defendants who lack the knowledge of the common man. 
2. Judicial Discretion 
Judicial discretion has also been an important means of softening the impact of the 
criminal justice system on indigenous defendants. For example, in the Australian case, 
R. v. Aboriginal Muddarubba, 141 the reasonableness of the defendant's action was measured 
by the norms of the defendant's community. This provided a basis for an aboriginal to 
have a defense at law. The defendant speared a woman who had verbally insulted him. 
Under Australian law such a killing was manslaughter, if circumstances were such that 
the average reasonable person would have reacted with violence. Judge Kriewaldt, who 
is noted for his decisions concerning Aboriginals, held that the test as to whether the 
behavior was due to provocation is what the average person would have done in the 
accused's position. The average reasonable person standard, however, had to reflect the 
norms of the accused's community.142 
This distinction was central to the outcome of the case. To the average white 
Australian words alone are not sufficient provocation to warrant a homicide. To the 
average reasonable Pi~intara, however, an insult given with specific words could be 
sufficient provocation to kill the speaker. 14! 
Judicial discretion has also been employed in the interpretation of a statute so that 
the law might better conform to a customary culture. In Regina v. N oboi-Bosai and Others, 144 
seven persons were charged with a violation of § 236 of the Criminal Code of Papua 
and New Guineal45 for "improperly and indecently" interfering with a dead human 
body. Justice Prentice of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea 
readily conceded that § 236 could be interpreted to apply to the accused. Moreover, he 
had no doubt that in England cannibalism would be held a common law misdemeanor.146 
He rejected, however, the idea that there might be an objective standard for interpreting 
the words "indecent" and "improper."147 Absent a clear legislative intent to make the 
practice of cannibalism illegal, he refused to find the defendants guilty of any wrong-
doing. 148 
159 Kajuna slo MBake, 12 E.A.C.A. at 105. 
140 Rex v: Mawalwa Bin Nyangweza, 7 E.A.C.A. 62 (Tanganiyka 1940). 
141 [1956] N. Territory Judgments 317 
142Id. at 322. 
14S Id. at 321-22. 
144 [1971] P. & N.G.L.R. 271 (Territory of Papua New Guinea). 
145 Section 236 of the Criminal Code provides that: 
[A]ny person, who without lawful justification or excuse, the proof of which lies on 
him ... 
(2) Improperly or indirectly interferes with ... any dead human body ... is guilty of 
a misdemeanor and is liable to imprisonment with hard labour for two years. 
146 Noboi-Bosai, [1971] P. & N.G.L.R. at 280. 
147 Cf Id. at 284. 
148Id. at 278-79. 
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Finally, in R. v. Luka Metengula I49 the court appeared to have gone to great lengths 
to avoid convicting the four defendants of murder. The defendants had been pallbearers 
in a tribal mourning ceremony in which the coffin is alleged to point out the person 
responsible for the deceased's death. In the instant case, the coffin "pointed out" an 
elderly woman. She was then rammed three times with the coffin, which caused her 
death. 
The Court tried to determine if the four pallbearers acted with malice aforethought 
and were therefore guilty of murder. Based on the fact that deaths in such ceremonies 
were no longer common, the Court concluded that the defendants did not intend for 
their victim to die and that her demise was partly due to her unfortunate physical frailty. 
As a result, the defendants were convicted of only manslaughter. I5o 
The decision discussed the strong belief of the defendant's community in the power 
of a deceased individual to control its pallbearers. l5l The great interest shown by the 
Court in the defendants' beliefs suggests that despite the discomfort with this native 
practice, 152 there was a reluctance to punish the defendants for activity that they may 
have thought was normative. The Court may have been recognizing that the intent of 
these defendants did not contain the moral culpability that would be attributed to the 
average Englishman for an intent which accompanied a comparable action. Therefore, 
despite the societal interest in discouraging the defendants' conduct, it would have been 
unjust to bring the full weight of the law upon them. 
3. Executive Clemency 
A third and very common means of mitigating the impact of the criminal justice 
system upon guilty, but not blameworthy, native defendants has been through appeals 
to an executive authority to grant a pardon due to the unusual circumstances of a case. 153 
In colonial Africa, courts regularly convicted defendants for murder, sentenced them to 
death, and then recommended that the Executive grant clemency. 154 
An example is the case of R. v. Isekwe Iferonwe. I55 The appellant admitted to killing 
the deceased. He claimed, however, that this was justified because the deceased had cast 
ju-ju (a type of magic) upon him causing him to become ill and had then refused to 
remove it. The court acknowledged the defendant's beliefs, but could find no basis for 
finding the appellant's actions "reasonable in law" within the meaning of § 25 of the 
Nigerian Criminal Code. I56 Nevertheless, the court concluded that it was certain that 
"the circumstances of the case will be carefully considered by the proper authority."157 
149 [1952) L.R.N.R. 148 (Nyasaland). 
I50ld. at 152-54. 
I5Ild. at 152. 
1521d. at 154. 
153 See Akope s/o Kauron, 14 E.A.C.A. at 107; Gadam v. Regina, 14 E.A.C.A. at 443; Kimutai Arap 
Mursoi, 6 E.A.C.A. at 117; Mawalwa Bin Nyangwew, 7 E.A.C.A. at 62. 
IS4 "With monotonous regularity courts have convicted [and) sentenced the defendant to death 
and in the same breath recommended executive clemency." Seidman, supra note 69, at 48. 
155 Selected Judgments of the West African Court of Appeals 79 (Nig. 1950). 
156 Section 25 of the Criminal Code of Nigeria: 
A person who does or omits to do an act under an honest and reasonable, but mistaken 
belief in the existence of any state of things is not criminally responsible for the act of 
omission to any greater extent than if the real state of things had been such as he 
believed to exist. 
157 R. v. lsekwe lferone, Selected Judgments at 81. 
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Attempts by each of the governmental branches to mitigate the impact of judicial 
proceedings upon indigenous defendants reflect the awkward state of the law in these 
cases. On the one hand, there is a reluctance to sanction conduct which is perceived as 
immoral. On the other hand, it is troubling, if not immoral, to punish someone for 
activity that their own environment reinforced and which they had no means of knowing 
might invite criminal sanction in the adjudicating culture. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Morally culpable criminal conduct usually arises from a willful or blameworthy 
disregard for the law. Where a defendant has committed a criminal act, but is not morally 
culpable, a variety of legal devices exist with which he can prove his innocence. Excusing 
such individuals presents no risk to society precisely because they are not morally deviant 
and can, therefore, be expected not to disregard the law. 
Where a defendant comes from a foreign culture, however, moral innocence may 
not be an assurance of future conformity. A person who neither knows or could reason-
ably be expected to know the minimum standards of conduct in the adjudicating society 
may be morally innocent when intentionally committing a wrongful act, but may also 
lack the capacity to make his behavior conform. Courts and legislatures, mindful of the 
dangers that may result, have tended to overlook a defendant's state of mind in finding 
him criminally liable for conduct which was normative in the defendant's culture. 
The consequences, however, have often been troubling and various strategies have 
been tried to mitigate the possible injustice. These have included legislative attempts to 
accommodate indigenous practices, exercises of judicial discretion to mold the law more 
closely to the unusual circumstances presented by these cases, and frequent use of 
executive clemency to prevent injustice against unwitting defendants. 
None of these actions, however, have afforded a comprehensive scheme for rein-
tegrating the defendant's mental state into the determination of his guilt or innocence. 
At the core of the conceptual problem that legislatures and courts have faced is the 
insistence that ignorance of the law is not an excuse for criminal activity and is itself 
morally culpable. The concluding portion of this note will examine the extent to which 
this maxim is, in fact, true, and its applicability to the circumstances under review. 
Despite the common perception that knowledge of the law is irrebuttably presumed, 
in the last century there has developed a variety of exceptions to the rule. 15S Consider-
ations of justice seem to have figured prominently in these changes.159 For example, 
where a defendant has had no realistic opportunity to know of a law's passage due to 
incomplete or improper publication, courts have, in some cases, acquitted the defen-
dant. 160 Currently, at least seven U.S. jurisdictions have some kind of defense arising 
from these or similar circumstances. 161 The New Jersey statute, for example, states that: 
158 Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 35, 36 (1939); Hall and 
Seligman, supra note 28, at 642. 
159 See Cotton Planter Case, 6 F. Cas. 620, 620-22 (1810) (A law promulgated before a ship left 
port, which placed an embargo on all ships and vessels in the ports and harbors of the United 
States, was held unenforceable against the defendant. The reasoning for the holding was that, given 
the facts, the defendant neither had nor could have had notice of the law before the ship sailed.). 
160 Id.; but see Hall and Seligman, supra note 28, at 656-58. 
161 These jurisdictions include Guam, Kansas, Missouri, Montana and New Jersey. Robinson, 2 
CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES, supra note 25, at 381. 
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(c) A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a defense 
to a prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct when: 
(3)The actor ... diligently pursues all means available to ascertain the mean-
ing and application of the offenses to his conduct and honestly and in good 
faith concludes his conduct is not an offense in circumstances in which a law 
abiding and prudent person would also so conclude. 162 
183 
Similarly, where an individual relies on an official misstatement of the law and 
receives an erroneous interpretation, his ignorance is usually excusable.16~ At least eigh-
teen U.S. jurisdictions recognize this principle in some form.l64 Exceptions to the general 
rule, that ignorance is no excuse, look to the defendant's culpability for his ignorance. 
The development of these exceptions follows the precedent set by some European 
legal systems, which had been influenced by canon law. 
In these systems a distinction has existed between culpable and non-culpable ignorance 
of the law. 165 Culpable ignorance has been termed vincible and arises where one prac-
ticing ordinary diligence would have had the necessary knowledge. 166 Non-culpable 
ignorance, on the other hand, reflected the defendant's incapacity to acquire the nec-
essary information. 167 The new German Penal Code is an example of a statute which 
makes this distinction. 16s 
One of the arguments against admitting such a distinction is that defendants will 
try to escape criminal sanction by pleading ignorance of the law. Such abuses can be 
avoided by placing the burden of production and persuasion in proving this ignorance 
on the defendant. The difficulty in sustaining this burden would curtail abuses, while 
allowing the morally blameless to prove their special circumstances. 169 
Aliens confronted with legal standards they did not or could not have known about 
might then be able to have a defense in law without the corresponding risk of encour-
aging ignorance of the law. The following consideration might guide an evaluation of 
an alien defendant's culpability for her ignorance. 
1) Was the defendant's lack of familiarity with a particular law or the ethics of the 
common man reasonable in light of their cultural origins, the length of time in the 
United States or a similar culture, and the communal environment they have lived in 
since coming to America? 
2) If the answer to the first question is yes, was the defendant's conduct reasonable 
in light of the values of his culture of origin? 
The first question provides the defendant with a basis for asserting an excuse for 
his lack of familiarity with the law. The second question insures that the excuse is in fact 
justified by the defendant's lack of moral culpability. 
The advantages of this formula are twofold. First, it insures that a defendant has a 
means for rebutting the presumption that he had the mens rea for an act. This protects 
162 N.]. Code: N.]. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-4(e)(3). 
16' Robinson, 2 CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES supra note 25, at 377-78. 
164Id. at 386. Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Texas, Utah 
and American Samoa. 
165 Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, supra note 23, at 8. 
166 Arzt, Ignorance or Mistake of Laws, 24 AM. ]. COMPo L. 646, 646 n.l (1976). 
167 Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, supra note 23, at 8. 
168 Arzt, supra note 166, at 650-51. 
169 Robinson, 2 CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES supra note 25, at 378-79. 
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people from being convicted of a crime without a reasonable assessment of their culp-
ability for the act. Second, it requires that the defendant prove his incapacity to know 
that he had committed a crime. The difficulty in proving this fact will have the corre-
sponding effect of preventing this defense from becoming a general loophole for im-
migrants with criminal predilections. This, in turn, can insure that the public safety is 
protected. 
In other words, this defense is designed to discover the truly innocent without 
compromising the law's capacity to deter criminal behavior in the population at large. 
Such a solution would enable the courts to maintain the delicate balance between the 
moral dictates of the criminal justice system and the need to uphold laws which sustain 
the social fabric. 
Robert Leikind 
